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Article 4

Refusals To Deal By Single-Firm Monopolists-Should
We Rob Peter To Save Paul?
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, ' a single firm can freely refuse
to deal with another firm without being found guilty of the offense of
monopolization if that single firm does not intend to create or maintain a
monopoly.2 Single firms which already possess monopoly power by virtue of their position 4as natural monopolists3 or through their control of
"essential facilities," however, have had their freedom to refuse to deal
restricted by the courts. In these cases, the courts have found that a refusal to deal constitutes
exclusionary conduct in violation of section 2 of
5
the Sherman Act.
Since courts have found some single firms in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act because of their refusals to deal, some argue that single
firms have an affirmative duty to deal with other firms to avoid section 2
liability. This note analyzes various situations in which courts have found
a single firm's refusal to deal to constitute monopolization in violation of
section 2. Part I of this note discusses the offense of monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Part II analyzes Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. ,6 the Supreme Court's most recent decision
regarding conduct for a lawful monopolist. Part III discusses the antitrust consequences in the Seventh Circuit after Aspen Skiing for two firms
that recently refused to deal with other firms. Part IV suggests that in
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part: "[e]very person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...." See infra notes 8-20 and accompanying text. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), allows any person "injured in his business or
property" by an antitrust violation to recover damages. Id.
Section 2 delineates three separate offenses: 1) attempt to monopolize; 2) conspiracy to monopolize; and 3) monopolization. The offense of attempt to monopolize is defined as a specific intent to
monopolize and the dangerous probability of success. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375
(1905). However, when the plaintiff presents "adequate evidence of monopoly power, he can get no
mileage out of charging attempted as well as completed monopolization." Olympia Equip. Leasing
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1574 (1987).
This note will discuss cases which only involve allegations of the completed offense of
monopolization.
2 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
3 A natural monopolist is a monopolist whose power is over a natural monopoly market. A
natural monopoly market has room for only one firm. Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982). See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
4 A facility is essential if it is necessary for access to the relevant market (see infra note 14) and a
competitor cannot "practically or reasonably . . . duplicate" it. MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). For a
discussion of the essential facilities doctrine, see infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
5 Exclusionary conduct is conduct on the part of a firm that exercies monopoly power "which is
either predatory. . . or which is 'exclusionary' in purpose and effect." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 99-100 (1977). This definition was articulated by Judge Wyzanski in United

States v. United Shoe Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). Predatory conduct is conduct aimed
at eliminating competition through threatening to or engaging in tortious conduct. SULLIVAN, supra
at 99.
6 472 U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
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certain situations antitrust laws should not determine which prospective
natural monopolist is the best from the perspective of consumers.
I.

Monopolization and Refusal to Deal Under Section 2
of The Sherman Act

On its face, section 2 of the Sherman Act neither defines the offense
of monopolization nor allows for the existence of "lawful" monopolies.
The courts, however, have defined the elements of the offense of monopare inevitable or desirolization so as to exclude those monopolies which
7
able and to include those which are harmful.
A. Elements of the Offense of Monopolization
The two elements of the offense of monopolization under section 2
of the Sherman Act were articulated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Grinnell.8 In Grinnell, defendant Grinnell Corporation manufactured fire sprinkler systems while its three affiliates, controlled through
stock ownership, supplied fire and burglar alarm systems to subscribers'
premises. Grinnell Corporation and its affiliates acquired 87 percent of
the country's insurance company-accredited central station protective
service market 9 by acquiring competitors,' 0 contracting for restrictive
agreements allocating certain geographical and service markets exclu2
sively to one of the affiliates," and through pricing arrangements.'
The Supreme Court held that Grinnell Corporation and its affiliates
acquired their monopoly power "in large part by unlawful and exclusibnary practices."' 3 These practices constituted monopolization in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court used a two-prong analysis to
define the offense of monopolization. The first prong is the possession
of monopoly power in the relevant market,14 and the second prong is the
7 The Supreme Court in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
noted that Senator Hoar, co-sponsor of the section 2 legislation, realized that "a man who merely by
superior skill and intelligence.., got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he
at 390 n.15 quoting 21 CONG. REc. 3152 (1890).
I.d.."
could was not a monopolist ..
8 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
9 Subscribers who used accredited central station services received greater reductions in insurance premiums than those who used nonaccredited services. Id. at 567. The Court found that the
relevant market was that for accredited services only. Id. at 575.
10 One of Grinnell's affiliates, ADT, had purchased the stock or assets of some 27 companies
which had provided fire or burglar alarm services. Id. at 567.
11 For example, ADT had the exclusive right to provide burglar alarm and nightwatch service
throughout the United States. It could not, however, provide service in those areas in which it had
given Holmes, another Grinnell affiliate, the exclusive right. Id. at 569.
12 The Court found that ADT had reduced its prices to meet competition, and once ADT had a
monopoly in a particular city, it renewed its contracts at substantially increased rates. Id. at 570.
13 Id. at 576. The Court was referring to the acquisitions, the restrictive agreements, and the
pricing policies. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
14 Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition in the relevant market.
United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Since United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the courts have generally looked at a firm's
degree of concentration of the relevant market. A natural moropolist by its very nature possesses
monopoly power. See infra note 23. The 'relevant market is defined both geographically and by
product. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 575, 571. The relevant geographical market depends upon the commercial realities of the particular industry. The relevant market must also be economically significant. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962). In Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc.,
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15

or the "conduct"

prong.
It is important to note that the offense of monopolization does not
require specific intent to monopolize, 16 but rather only a finding by a
court that the conduct is illegal. The courts have developed the exclusionary conduct test which determines whether a firm's conduct violates

the second prong of Grinnell, thus constituting monopolization in violation of section 2.17 Under this test, a firm violates section 2 by obtaining
or holding monopoly power through conduct which is either predatory
or which is exclusionary in purpose' 8 or effect.2019 Such illegal conduct
has been termed anticompetitive by the courts.
Most often, the jury must draw the fine line between illegal anticompetitive conduct and lawful conduct with which the antitrust laws should
not be concerned. 2' Cases involving natural monopolists and firms that

570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978), the plaintiff claimed that he was
unable to secure an American Football League franchise in Washington, D.C. because the defendant, owner of the National Football League Washington Redskins, refused to waive a restrictive covenant it had with RFK Stadium which prohibited a lease with any other professional football team.
The court found "[g]iven the posture of the case, it seems evident that the relevant geographical
market is the D.C. metropolitan area: it is here that 'the seller operates ....
Id. at 989. In cases
involving professional sports and franchises, the courts in defining the relevant product market look
to the "area of effective meaningful competition under the circumstances of the particular case."
Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378 (N.D. Ill. 1981) at 74,763. In Hecht, supra note
14, a case with facts very similar to Fishman, the court found the relevant product market to be the
business of professional football. Hecht, 570 F.2d at 988.
The relevant product market consists of those commodities which are reasonably interchangeable. duPont, 351 U.S. at 395 (relevant product market for producer of cellophane was the market for
flexible packaging materials); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) ("The
outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or
the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.")
15 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
16 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948) ("It is, however, not always necessary to
find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the antitrust laws
have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequence of
a defendant's conduct or business arrangements."). The defendant's intent, however, is "relevant to
the question of whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as 'exclusionary' or 'anti-competitive'...." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct 2847, 2857
(1985). See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
17 Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953)
discussed the three tests the courts have used in evaluating a firm's conduct. First, the courts applied
the classic test, under which a firm whose conduct violated section 1 of the Sherman Act also violated
section 2. Id. at 342. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948).
Other courts used the prima facie approach which held that proof of the existence of monopoly
power creates a presumption of illegal monopolization which can be rebutted by a firm showing
"that its power is attributable sblely to a cause which the law does not wish to discourage .... "
SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 104. The exclusionary conduct test is the test used by the courts today.
18 SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 94.
19 Grijfith, 334 U.S. at 108 ("And even if we assume that a specific intent to accomplish that result
[a monopoly] is absent, he is chargeable in legal contemplation with that purpose since the end
result is the necessary and direct consequence of what he did.").
20 See Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2854.
21 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985),
the Supreme Court reviewed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support a
finding that the defendant's conduct was anticompetitive. The court noted the District Judge's instructions to thejury. After explaining the two elements of the offense of monopolization, the judge
elaborated:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anti-competitive or exclusionary, you
must draw a distinction here between practices which tend to exclude or restrict competi-
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control essential facilities magnify this subtle distinction. Courts consider
both a natural monopolist and the possessor of an essential facility as
lawful monopolists. 2 2 This means that both legally possess monopoly
power in the relevant market. Since such firms possess their power legally, the second, or conduct, prong of the Grinnell test is the key prong
in antitrust analysis.
B.

NaturalMonopolies and Firms ControllingEssential FacilitiesThe Courts' Analyses

A natural monopoly market has room for only one firm.23 Since the

successful competitor for a natural monopoly market captures the entire
market, 24 all conduct by the eventual natural monopolist is exclusionary
by nature. This does not mean that competing for or acquiring a natural
monopoly is illegal per se 25 or that antitrust laws never protect competition in a natural monopoly. 26 The courts have held that a natural monopolist only violates section 2 of the Sherman Act if the natural
monopolist "acquired or maintained [its] power through the use of
means which are 'exclusionary, unfair or predatory.' "27
tion on the one hand and the success of a business which reflects only a superior product, a
well-run business, or luck, on the other.
Id. at 2854. See infra notes 56-72 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the difficulty in distinguishing between exclusionary and competitive conduct, and the resulting harm in failing to do so
correctly, see Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionaty Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972 (1986).
22

SULLIVAN, supra note 5, at 115.

23 Judge Posner states that "[ilf the entire demand within a relevant market can be satisfied at
lowest cost by one firm rather than by two or more, the market is a natural monopoly, whatever the
actual number of firms in it." Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548
(1969). A natural monopolist by its very nature possesses monopoly power in the relevant market,
the natural monopoly market.
24 Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1001 (1972). In Lamb Enterprises, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired to exclude it
from the community antenna television business in Toledo, Ohio. The court held that plaintiff and
defendants were competing for a natural monopolist position, and since only one competitor could
possibly survive, the defendant's success did not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
at 514.
25 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960)
("a natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions on one who actively, but fairly
competes for it .. ").See also Lamb, 461 F.2d at 514 ("[i]f success in such a venture could become a
per se violation of the antitrust laws, the ultimate effect would be to stifle, rather than to encourage,
competition and formation of new business enterprises."); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1974).
26 Numerous antitrust defendants have contended that in the struggle for control of a natural
monopoly market the antitrust laws should not govern the competition because the eventual winner
will be a monopolist either way, and in most cases will merely be a replacement for a previous monopolist. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464 (1962); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Ohio 1980). The Supreme Court in
Poller, however, rejected the defendant's contention that there was no violation of the antitrust laws
because the public would receive the same service. Poller, 368 U.S. at 473. See also Helix Milling Co.
v. Terminal Flour Mills Co., 523 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976) (an
agreement between defendant and a flour mill owner not to sell the flour mill to plaintiff, which was
the only means for plaintiff of entering the market, was a violation of the antitrust laws, even though
one of the two bidders would be unsuccessful anyway).
27 Hecht, 570 F.2d at 990 (quoting Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373,
378 (1969) (citation omitted)). See also American Football League v. National Football League, 323
F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963). Although intent is relevant with respect to the offense of monopolization
as far as characterizing the defendant's conduct as exclusionary, see supra note 16, the mere intent to
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As with the control of a natural monopoly, the control of an essential
facility is not illegal per se. The courts have developed the essential facility doctrine 28 to determine whether the mere control of an essential facility constitutes exclusionary conduct in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Courts invoke the essential facility doctrine when a firm
controlling an essential facility has refused to make the facility available
to others. The doctrine has been articulated as follows:
[I]f a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if due to natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is
not feasible for excluded competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the facility must give access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, non-discriminatory terms.29
Examples of essential facilities include the only railroad terminal system
in a city, 30 a building near a railroad terminal which houses the local
wholesale produce mai-ket, 3 1 electrical transmission lines,3 2 and33 the only
stadium suitable for professional football in Washington, D.C.
C. Illegal Conductfor Natural Monopolists and Firms
ControllingEssential Facilities
In cases involving natural monopolists or essential facilities, the
greatest difficulty arises when courts apply the second, or conduct, prong
of the Grinnell analysis to a single defendant's activities, particularly when
the defendant has allegedly refused to deal with a competitor. Courts
seem to apply stricter scrutiny when evaluating conduct by lawful monopolists, e.g., natural monopolists and controllers of essential facilities.
In theory, however, a refusal to deal by a firm competing for or controlling a natural monopoly market and a refusal to deal by a firm which
gain power in a natural monopoly market does not constitute exclusionary intent. Union Leader, 284
F.2d at 587.
28 See supra note 4.
The case law sets forth four elements necessary to establish liability under the essential
facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use
of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
29 L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ANTITRUST § 48, at 131 (1977). Sullivan's definition
reflects the cases of OtterTail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (see infra notes 46-54
and accompanying text); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (lst
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952) (see infra note 45); and United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n,
224 U.S. 383 (1912) (see infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text). All of the above cases involved
groups of competitors who attempted through a joint venture to exclude or actually excluded other
competitors from the essential facilities. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
30 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
31 Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 817 (1952). See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
32 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court in Otter Tail did not label the electrical transmission lines
controlled by Otter Tail as essential facilities, the Court did note that Otter Tail's potential competitors at the retail level had to have access to existing transmission lines, and "[t]he only ones available
belong to Otter Tail." Id. at 370 (footnote omitted). Thus, Otter Tail reflects the fact pattern of an
essential facility case, but does not explicitly name the doctrine. See Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck - A
New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 451 n.62 (1983).
33 Hecht, 570 F.2d 982. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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controls an essential facility are subjected34 to the same antitrust analysis
as any other single firm's refusal to deal.
In Hecht v. Pro-Football,Inc.,a the District of Columbia Circuit analyzed the legality of a firm's conduct where the firm had already acquired
control of a natural monopoly market. In Hecht, the court found that an
exclusive lease between the Washington Redskins and RFK Stadium illegally restrained trade and that the Redskins' unilateral refusal to waive
the exclusivity provision of the lease constituted an illegal refusal to deal
in violation of section 2.36 On the other hand; the Eighth Circuit in Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co. 3 7 found that a newspaper holding a natural
monopoly of its own wholesale newspaper market in Kansas City could
refuse to deal with the independent carriers, which had previously distributed its papers to the public, without violating section 2.38 The
Eighth Circuit, relying heavily on economic theory, held that the newspaper's vertical integration 39 was not exclusionary conduct because it
would not have unreasonable anticompetitive effects and would in fact
40
benefit consumers.
Firms that control essential facilities also risk having their refusals to
deal labeled as exclusionary conduct and therefore in violation of section
2 of the Sherman Act. The first essential facility case, United States v. Ter34 Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 856 (6th Cir. 1979). The Byars court discussed the
two circumstances under which courts have imposed a duty to deal upon a lawful monopolist (finding
that a refusal to deal violated section 2). In the first instance, the courts look to a monopolist's, e.g.,
natural monopolist, intent in refusing to deal (the "intent" theory of liability). A monopolist who
refuses to deal with the intent of preserving a monopoly has violated section 2. Id. See Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Otter Tail, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
The second situation involves the control of an essential facility by a firm. The Byars court called
this the "bottleneck" theory of liability. Byars, 609 F.2d at 856. A firm controlling such a facility
must provide "reasonable access" to that facility. Id. See United States v. Terminal R.R, Ass'n, 224
U.S. 383 (1912); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
The Byars court noted that in Otter Tail the Supreme Court seemed to merge both of the above
theories in order to find the defendant liable. Byars, 609 F.2d at 857. Citing Byars, the Fifth Circuit
in Mid-Texas Communication Systems v. American Tel. & Tel., 615 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 912 (1980), noted that the theoretical differences between the two approaches do not bear
out in practice. Id. at 1388 n.12. One commentator has said that the cases which invoke the essential facility doctrine are actually a subset of all natural monopoly cases and should be analyzed as
such. Cirace, An EconomicAnalysis ofAntitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REv. 677, 678
(1986).
35 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
36 Id. at 993 n.44. The Hecht court seemed to focus on the agreement between the Redskins and
the operators of RFK Stadium which the court found would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act,
"provided of course, that the facility can be shared practically." Id. at n.45. The plaintiff in Hecht
wished to use the stadium as a home for a second professional football team. Once the Hecht court
found the exclusive lease an illegal restraint of trade, it then noted that the Redskins could be found
liable under section 2 for unilaterally refusing to waive the illegal provision. The Hecht court also
found that the stadium was an essential facility.
37 727 F.2d 692 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied 459 U.S. 872 (1984).
38 Id. at 704. The plaintiffs, 250 independent newspaper carriers, sought an injunttion prohibiting the termination of their contracts with the Star.
39 When a single firm acquires control of two or morestages of the production and distribution
of one end product, vertical integration is.said to occur. A firm which acquires a competitor in order
to create a monopoly has horizontally integrated. III P. AREEDA & I. TURNER, ANTIrRusT LAw &723

(1978).
40 Paschall, 727 F.2d at 703-04.
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minal Railroad Association, 4 I was decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1912. In Terminal Railroad, fourteen out of the twenty-four railroad companies which converged in St. Louis obtained control of all
three of the previously independently controlled terminal systems in that
city. These fourteen proprietary railroads agreed that non-proprietary
railroads would be allowed to join the system only upon unanimous con42
sent of all fourteen proprietary railroads.
Although the Court never expressly called the terminal system an
essential facility, it treated it as one. 4 3 Since not all of the companies
compelled to use the system were proprietary companies, 44 the Court
found that the combination which controlled the terminal system constituted a combination in restraint
of commerce in violation of sections 1
45
and 2 of the Sherman Act.

Otter Tail Power Company v. United States, 46 often cited as reaffirming
the essential facility doctrine, 4 7 also made no direct reference to the essential facility doctrine in its opinion. Otter Tail was a vertically integrated power company which had a natural monopoly over the wheeling
of power because it owned the only transmission lines in the area, and it
also produced and sold electric power in the retail market.4 8 When some
of the municipalities which Otter Tail had served decided to establish
41 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
42 Id. at 399. Although the government conceded that nonproprietary railroads were allowed to
use the terminal facilities upon paying the same charges as the proprietary companies, no such provision was found in the agreement. Id. at 400.
43 The Court in Terminal Railroad noted:
The result of the geographical and topographical situation is that it is, as a practical
matter, impossible for any railroad company to pass through, or even enter St. Louis, so as
to be within reach of its industries or commerce, without using the facilities entirely controlled by the Terminal Company.
Id. at 397. The court found that the nonproprietary companies were compelled to use the Terminal
Railroad-controlled system, and that this compulsion was "the factor which gives greatest color to
the unlawfulness of the combination as now controlled and operated." Id. at 398.
44 Id. at 404. The court noted thataWitness for the defense, the railroad expert of the Municipal
Bridge and Terminal Board, testified that if every railroad using the terminal system were a joint
owner of the system it would "serve the greatest possible economy, and [would] give the most efficient service without discrimination." Id. at 406.
45 Id. at 409. The Court decreed that the contract between the fourteen proprietary railroads be
reorganized so that any other railroad be allowed to join on fair and reasonable terms, and those
who elected not to join be allowed to use the terminal system on such terms that they would be on
"'nearly an equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and charges as that occupied by the
proprietary companies." Id. at 411.
The circuits have struggled with analyzing the conduct of a firm controlling an essential facility.
In Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 817 (1952), the First Circuit held that the defendant corporation, a group of produce wholesalers which controlled a building used for produce markets, violated section 2 when it refused to allow
the plaintiff-wholesaler to sell his produce in the building. Id. at 488. The court found that control
of the building, which was the center of the local wholesale produce trade, placed the corporation in
a monopoly position, and the "conjunction of power and motive to exclude with an exclusion not
immediately and patently justified by reasonable business requirements establishes a prima facie
case of the purpose to monopolize." Id. Since the Building Corporation offered no business justification for the plaintiff's exclusion, the court held that its refusal to deal violated section 2. Id. at
489.
46 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
47 Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992.
48 Id. at 369. Each municipality could support only one retailer of electric power, so each municipality was a natural monopoly with regards to the retail sale of electric power.
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their own municipal power systems, 49 Otter Tail refused to sell those
municipal systems power which it had generated as well as power that
was generated by other producers. 50
The Supreme Court found that Otter Tail had used the monopoly
power it possessed in the market of wheeling electricity to impede competition in another market, i.e., the retail electricity market, in violation
of the Sherman Act. 5 1 The Court disagreed with Otter Tail's argument
that compulsory wheeling could erode its integration system and impair
its ability to adequately serve the public. 52 The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on LorainJournal Company v. United States, 5 3 stating that
LorainJournal"dealt neither with a natural monopoly at retail nor with
the congressionally approved system predicated on the existence of such
' 54
monopolies.
II. Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Ski Corporation
Since the Supreme Court in Terminal Railroad up through Otter Tail
had found that some refusals to deal by a controller of an essential facility or a natural monopolist constitute exclusionary conduct, it appeared
that some monopolists may have an actual duty to deal with their competitors. These Supreme Court decisions also created confusion in the circuits regarding the lawful conduct for a lawful monopolist, i.e., a
controller of an essential facility or a natural monopolist. Aspen Skiing
Company v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation55 presented these issues to
the Supreme Court in 1985, but the Court failed to clear up the
ambiguities. 5 6
The defendant, Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.), owned and operated three of the four ski mountains in the Aspen area. The plaintiff,
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation (Highlands), owned the fourth
49 Otter Tail had previously served those municipalities through franchises. When the
franchises expired, the citizens in the towns voted to establish municipal systems. Id. at 370-71.
50 Id. at 371.
51 Id. at 377. The Court relied on the District Court's finding that Otter Tail refused to wheel
solely to enhance its position as a monopolist. Id. at 378.
52 Id. at 381.
53 342 U.S. 143 (1951). See infra note 54. In LorainJournal,a single newspaper was a natural
monopolist in the daily newspaper market in Lorain, Ohio. The newspaper disseminated news and
advertising to 9976 of the families in Lorain. The newspaper was the only means of advertising for
Lorain businesses until a radio station was established in nearby Elyria. The newspaper then refused
to accept advertising from businesses who advertised or who the newspaper believed advertised on
the radio station. Id. at 149.
The Supreme Court found that the newspaper had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by
using its monopoly to destroy threatened competition. Id. at 155. By virtually closing off the radio
station to advertisers, the newspaper had used its monopoly power in the newspaper market to foreclose competition in the market for advertising.
54 410 U.S. at 388 (Stewart, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stewart noted
that the residents of the municipalities would be faced with a monopolist no matter what the result of
the competition between Otter Tail and. the municipal systems, because the retail market was a natural monopoly. In LorainJournal,on the other hand, the monopolist, a newspaper, impeded competition in the communications business, a market which was not a natural monopoly. Id. at 388-89.
55 472 U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
56 Travers, Jr., Does A Monopolist Have A Duty To Deal With Its Rivals? Some Thoughts on the Aspen
Skiing Case, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 727 at 728 (1986). Travers notes that many commentators had seen
Aspen Skiing as an opportunity for the Court to clear up the confusion in the circuits by narrowing the
definition of exclusionary conduct and therefore limiting the offense of monopolization. Id. at 737.
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mountain. From 1962-1978, the two companies jointly offered an allAspen ticket that allowed skiers to use any of the four mountains 5 7 regardless of the company from which the ticket was purchased. 58 In 1978,
Ski Co. decided to discontinue the all-Aspen ticket, and Highlands' market share in the downhill skiing market declined from 20.5 percent in
1976-1977 to 11 percent in 1980-1981.5 9 Without the all-Aspen ticket,
Highlands became a day ski area. 60 Highlands filed suit, alleging that Ski
Co. had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by its refusal to continue
in the joint marketing arrangement.
The District Court judge instructed the jury that a firm which possesses monopoly power has no duty to cooperate with its rivals. 6 1 The
jury was also instructed that a firm's refusal to deal with a competitor
does not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act so long as "valid business
reasons exist for that refusal." 6 2 Conduct for which there was no valid
business reason, according to the judge's instructions, was exclusionary
conduct, i.e., "conduct which does not benefit consumers by making a
better product or service available-or in other ways-and instead has
the effect of impairing competition." 6 3 The jury, by specific interrogatory, found that Ski Co. had not met the conduct prong of Grinnell and
thus had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. 64
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision on two
grounds. 65 First, the Tenth Circuit held that the all-Aspen ticket was an
"essential facility" which Ski Co. had a duty to market jointly with Highlands. 66 Second, the court found that Ski Co.'s refusal to deal, along with
its other conduct, demonstrated an intent to create or maintain a
67
monopoly.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision, relying
solely on the second part of the decision, despite Ski Co.'s contention
that the decision against it was based on the erroneous proposition that a
57 105 S. Ct. at 2850. The all-Aspen ticket, which actually began as a coupon booklet, consisted
of a tag which the skier wore around the neck. The ticket could be used for six days and those with
the tag did not need to visit the ticket window every morning before skiing. Id. at 2851.
58 Revenues from the all-Aspen ticket sales were divided according to the usage bf each of the
four mountains. Random surveys were taken to determine how many skiers used each mountain. Id.
at 2851. For example, during the 1974-75 ski season, Highlands received 18.5% of the revenues
from the ticket, while in 1976-77, it received 13.2%. Id. Prior to the 1977-78 season, however, Ski
Co. offered Highlands a flat 13.2% of the revenues. Highlands wanted the distribution to be based
on actual usage, but eventually settled for a fixed 15% rate. Id. at 2852.
59 Id. at 2853. Highlands did attempt to put together its own all-Aspen ticket by purchasing Ski
Co. tickets at the tour operator's discount and at retail. Ski Co. refused to sell any lift tickets to
Highlands. Id. Ski Co. also refused to accept vouchers from Highlands' customers equal to the price
of a lift ticket at Ski Co.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 2854.
62 Id. at 2854, quoting District Court jury instructions.
63 Id. at 2854, quoting District Court jury instructions. The jury had found that Ski Co. possessed monopoly power in the relevant market, "the downhill skiing at destination resorts market"
in the Aspen area. Id. at 2854 n.20, quoting Aspen Skiing, 738 F.2d at 1513.
64 Id. at 2855. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
65 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984).
66 Id. at 1520-21. The court relied on Terminal Railroad;see supra notes 41-45 and accompanying
text.
67 Id. at 1522. The Tenth Circuit held that Ski Co. had shown no valid business reason for
refusing to accept Highland's vouchers.
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monopolist has a duty to cooperate with its rivals. The Supreme Court,
in rejecting this contention, noted
that the jury was dearly instructed that
68
the law imposed no such duty.
Although the law imposes no duty to cooperate, the Court noted
that the "absence of an unqualified duty to cooperate does not mean that
every time a firm declines to participate in a cooperative venture, that
decision may not have evidentiary significance, or, that it may not give
rise to liability in certain circumstances. ' 6 9 Since the jury concluded
that Ski Co.'s conduct was exclusionary, the Court examined the record
to determine whether the record supported that conclusion.
In evaluating Ski Co.'s conduct, the Court noted that it was not only
necessary to look at its impact on Highlands but also the effect on consumers and on the Ski Co. 70 The Court found that the jury's conclusion
was "strongly supported by Ski Co.'s failure to offer any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern of conduct." 7 1 Therefore, 'the injury to
consumers and to Highlands was not justified, and Ski Co.'s conduct was
72
termed exclusionary conduct.
III. Refusals to Deal by Lawful Monopolists Since Aspen Skiing
The Seventh Circuit, in two recent cases since Aspen Skiing, had the
opportunity to evaluate the antitrust implications of refusals to deal by
two lawful monopolists. In Olympia Equipment Leasing Company v. Western
Union Telegraph Company, 73 the defendant was a natural monopolist which
68 - Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2857. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
69 Id. at 2856. The Court cited Lorainjournal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) as holding
that the right to refuse to deal is not unqualified. Although Lorain Journal concerned a claim of
attempted monopolization, see supra note 53, the Court noted that intent is relevant to both the
offense of attempted monopolization and monopolization. "In the latter case [monopolization] evidence of intent is merely relevant to the question of whether the challenged conduct is fairly characterized as "exclusionary" or "anticompetitive" - to use the words in the trial court's instructions - or
"predatory," to use a word that scholars seem to favor." Id. at 2857. Specific intent is not an element of the offense of monopolization. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
70

Id. at 2859, citing III P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw. 78 (1978).

Citing Judge

Bork, the Court said that "if a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than
efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." Id. (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST
PARADOX 138 (1978)). The Court found that consumers preferred the all-Aspen ticket, and that most
were dissatisfied with its unavailability after Ski Co. discontinued the arrangement. Aspen Skiing, 105
S. Ct. at 2859. As to the effect upon Highlands, the court noted the decline in market share since the
discontinuation of the all-Aspen ticket (see supra note 58 and accompanying text) and the pecuniary
injury to Highlands as established by expert testimony. Id. at 2860. The jury awarded Highlands
$2.5 million in damages, trebled to $7.5 million.
71 Id. at 2860 (footnote omitted). Ski Co. had contended that it had withdrawn from the allAspen ticket marketing arrangement because of the difficulty in monitoring the usage of each of the
four mountains and because it felt the skiing services offered by Highlands were inferior. Id. at
2861. The Supreme Court found, however, that the evidence showed Ski Co. used the same method
of monitoring usage on its own three mountains, and that the consumers should be the arbitors of
the quality of Highlands' facilities. Id.
72 Id. at 2862. As to the Tenth Circuit's finding of liability based on the essential facility doctrine, the Court in its final footnote stated: "[g]iven our conclusion that the evidence amply supports the verdict under the instructions as given by the trial court, we find it unnecessary to consider
the possible relevance of the "essential facilities" doctrine .... " Id. at 2862 n.44.
73 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 802 F.2d 217 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1574
(1987).
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obtained its monopoly power as a result of historical evolution, 74 while in
Fishman v. Wirtz 7 5 the defendant's monopoly power flowed from its control of an essential facility. In Olympia, the Seventh Circuit discussed
Aspen Skiing extensively in distinguishing it from Olympia and found that
the defendant had no duty to deal. 76 In.Fishman, the Seventh Circuit reSkiing only once and placed a duty to deal upon the
ferred to Aspen
77
defendant.
A.

Olympia

Western Union, before the 1970's, provided telex services 78 to its
subscribers by charging a "bundled" pfice, which included both the telex
service and the terminal which was r'equired to transmit and receive
messages. Like AT&T in the telephone terminal equipment market,
'ordered to open the telex terminal
Western Union was subsequently
79
market to competition.
In 1973, Western Union notified its subscribers that they could lease
their telex terminals from any vendor and still receive telex service from
Western Union. In addition, Western Union had its salespeople give
new subscribers a list of vendors which leased telex terminals. 80 One
such vendor was Olympia, which was formed in 1975 to take advantage
of the newly opened market for telex terminals. 8 ' Olympia flourished
until Western Union decided that it was liquidating its own stock of terminals too slowly. Western Union, therefore, encouraged its salespeople
to push its own terminals and to stop showing the vendor list to new
subscribers.8 2 Olympia's leases of terminals fell to zero, and Olympia
went out of business in 1976.83
Olympia alleged that Western Union's decision not to show the vendor list to new subscribers constituted monopolization in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 84 The Seventh Circuit, noting the change
74 Western Union's development of"Telex" evolved from its historical position as a provider of
telegraph service. Id. at 372.
75 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
76 Olympia, 797 F.2d at 377-79. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
77 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 536. The Seventh Circuit in Fishman noted that although the Supreme
Court in Aspen Skiing had considered the impact of Ski Co.'s conduct on consumers when labelling it
as exclusionary, the Court did not place the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate an injury to
consumers in order to show an antitrust violation. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
78 Telex is a service by which messages are transmitted over communications lines from one
subscriber's terminal to another. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 372.
79 Id. See Use of the Carterfone Device for Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 465 (7th Cir. 1984).
80 Western Union held a seminar for prospective vendors, encouraging them to enter the
market.
81 Olympia, 797 F.2d at 372. Olympia in fact had no salespeople to sell its terminals, but rather
relied solely on referrals from Western Union's salespeople. During one period in 1975, Olympia
sold 20% of all the telex terminals installed. Id. at 373.
82 Id. at 373.
83 Sales and leases by other vendors also fell, but those which had their own sales forces from
the start were able to stay in business. Id.
84 Olympia conceded that Western Union did not originally have a duty to assist terminal vendors by providing the vendor list to subscribers, but contended that once it had undertaken to do so,
it could not stop without a valid business reason. Id. at 375, 378.
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in opinion about monopolists, 85 found that a lawful monopolist has "no
general duty to help its competitors, whether by holding a price umbrella
over their heads or by otherwise pulling its competitive punches." 8 6 The
court noted that the Aspen Skiing opinion was narrowly written and imposed only a duty to deal in limited situations.87 The court distinguished
Aspen Skiing, finding that Western Union's conduct did not prevent Olympia from competing.88 The Court concluded by stating that so long as a
monopolist's methods are not calculated to make consumers worse off in
the long run, a monopolist can refuse to deal with a competitor, even if
the result is fatal to the competitor.8 9
B. Fishman v. Wirtz
In Fishman v. Wirtz, the plaintiffs, Marvin Fishman and Illinois Basketball, Inc. ("IBI"), brought suit against Chicago Professional Sports
Corporation ("CPSC") and Chicago Stadium Corporation, alleging that
CPSC had acquired the Chicago Bulls Professional Basketball team
through CPSC's refusal to lease Chicago Stadium to IBI, and that such
refusal violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
85 The court stated that in the era of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Akoa), 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), a lawful monopolist was expected to exercise special restraint, even to the point
of keeping its prices high, in order to encourage new competitors. Now, according to the Seventh
Circuit,
[A]s the emphasis of antitrust policy shifted from the protection of competition as process
of rivalry to the protection of competition as a means of promoting economic efficiency...
it became recognized that the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like everyone
else; otherwise the antitrust laws would be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors.
Olympia, 797 F.2d at 375 (citations omitted).
86 Olympia, 797 F.2d at 375.
87 Id at 379. "Ifit stands for any principle that goes beyond its unusual facts, it is that a monopolist may be guilty of monopolization if it refuses to cooperate with a competitor in circumstances
where some cooperation is indispensable to effective competition." Id.
88 Id. at 377.
[O]lympia remained free to compete by sending salesmen to call on Western Union's subscribers. This was not an illusory freedom. Firms better established than Olympia - firms
that had their own sales forces - weathered the withdrawal of the vendor list. Western
Union stopped helping Olympia but did not hinder it.
Id. at 379.
89 Id. at 379.
Most businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that matter competition. They want
as much money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of making a lot of money.
That is fine, however, so long as they do not use methods calculated to make consumers
worse off in the long run. Consumers would be worse off if a firm with monopoly power...
having extended it [assistance] voluntarily [had] a duty to continue it indefinitely.
Id.
In a petition for rehearing en banc, Olympia charged that the Seventh Circuit panel had
"avoided and counter-attacked" the Supreme Court's decision in Aspen Skiing, rather than following
it. Olympia, 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.), reh'g deniedpercuriam, 802 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1986). In denying
the petition for rehearing, the Seventh Circuit noted that its panel had "devoted extended consideration" to the Aspen Skiing case. Olympia, 802 F.2d at 215. For the Seventh Circuit's discussion of
Aspen Skiing, see Olympia, 797 F.2d at 377-79. The Seventh Circuit in its denial of rehearing noted
four important differences between Aspen Skiing and Olympia. One of these was the fact that in the
Aspen Skiing case the defendant refused to deal, despite the cost of customer good will, in order to
gain a competitive advantage. In the Olympia case, however, there was no "evidence that consumers
noticed or cared about the withdrawal of the vendor list .... Olympia, 802 F.2d at 216.
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When Chicago Basketball, former owner of the Bulls, decided to sell
the team, both IBI and CPSC attempted to negotiate a deal. 90 IBI
reached an agreement conditioned upon approval of the transfer by the
National Basketball Association ("NBA"). 91 The NBA refused to approve IBI's purchase of the Bulls unless IBI secured a lease of Chicago
Stadium, controlled by some members of CPSC.92 CPSC refused to
lease the
Stadium to IBI, 93 and the Bulls were subsequently sold to
94
CPSC.

Fishman and IBI filed suit in federal court alleging that the Wirtzes
and the Chicago Stadium Corporation had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by refusing to deal with IBI concerning a lease for Chicago Stadium, "thereby precluding plaintiffs from entering the market for the
90 In 1971 plaintiff Fishman formed his first investment group to purchase the Bulls which included defendants Albert Adelman, Lester Crown, Philip Klutznick and James Cook. Fishman, 807
F.2d at 525. This group reached an agreement in principle for $2.3 million with Chicago Basketball
in January of 1972. Fishman's group offered to lease Chicago Stadium from defendant Arthur Wirtz,
who along with his son controlled the Stadium, at a rate lower than Chicago Basketball was currently
paying. The Bulls had been playing at the Stadium under a series of one-year leases. The Chicago
Stadium Corporation refused the offer, and the group's subsequent lower offer to Chicago Basketball was refused. Id. at 526.
91 Id. at 526. Before Chicago Basketball accepted IBI's offer, defendant Adelman contacted Chicago Basketball president Rich and reminded Rich that IBI had no place for the Bulls to play and
also had not yet gotten NBA approval. Rich told Adelman that, although he did not see how any
offer by CPSC would get preference over IBI's offer, CPSC could submit a signed contract which
would incorporate all terms required by Chicago Basketball.
92 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 527. Those who withheld approval mentioned two reasons. First, IBI
had not yet secured a lease on a stadium, namely Chicago Stadium. Second, the NBA Governors
were well aware that CPSC wanted to purchase the Bulls. Id. Some of the CPSC shareholders had
sent telegrams to the Board of Governors prior to the execution of the IBI-Chicago Basketball contract, notifying the Board that CPSC had made a larger offer to Chicago Basketball, and that CPSC
had reached an agreement with Chicago Stadium Corporation for a ten-year lease of Chicago Stadium. Id.
93 Id. at 528. Defendant Wirtz met with Chicago Basketball president Rich and told him that the
Chicago Stadium Corporation would not discuss a lease with IBI because IBI did not own the Bulls.
Wirtz told Rich that he would consider executing a ten-year lease with Chicago Basketball, which
Chicago Basketball could assign to IBI only if it guaranteed the assignee's performance, including
rent payments, for the entire term. Wirtz also asked Rich either to sell the Bulls to CPSC or to let
the NBA Board of Governors choose between the two groups. Rich told Wirtz to put his ten-year
lease proposal in writing, and although Wirtz agreed, he never did so. Id. at 527. Rich told Wirtz
that Chicago Basketball would not accept a lease which was not freely assignable and which Chicago
Basketball would have to guarantee. He also said that since Chicago Basketball had already executed
a contract with IBI, it would not consider selling the Bulls to CPSC. Id.
Wirtz required the guarantee because he was concerned about IBI's financial responsibility. Id.
However, the District Court found that Wirtz never asked Fishman about the group's financial responsibility. "Moreover, the rent for Chicago Stadium was often taken 'off the top' of the office
receipts and, accordingly, the 'guarantee' concept appears to have been unrelated to any business
need of the Chicago Stadium." Fishman, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378 (N.D. Ill. 1981) at 74,751.
94 IBI terminated its contract with Chicago Basketball because of its failure to obtain NBA approval. Chicago Basketball then renewed negotiations with CPSC, and, after the execution of a contract, the NBA approved the transfer. Id. at 529.
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presentation of live basketball in Chicago." 95 The District Court held in
favor of the plaintiffs on all of the allegations. 96
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling that the
Wirtzes and the Chicago Stadium Corporation had violated section 2 by
refusing to lease Chicago Stadium to IBI, and that CPSC, CPSC members, the Chicago Stadium Corporation, and the Wirtzes had conspired
to withhold the lease in violation of sections 1 and 2. 9 7 The court agreed
that the relevant market was the presentation of live professional basketball in Chicago, 98 and that such a market was a natural monopoly market. 9 9 Despite the defendants' argument that the antitrust laws should
not govern competition for a natural monopoly market,1 0 0 the court held
that in Otter Tail the Supreme Court established that competition for a
natural monopoly market was protected.' 0 '
The defendants then countered that even if some natural monopoly
cases fell within the scope of the Sherman Act; the Fishman case should
not because the plaintiff had failed to show how consumers were injured
by the defendants' conduct.' 0 2 The Seventh Circuit responded that
although "enhancement of consumer welfare is an important policy probably the paramount policy - informing the antitrust laws,"' 0 3 it had
found no cases which placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate
injury to consumers when the alleged conduct was not aimed at the consumer level. 10 4 The court distinguished its own decision in Brunswick

95 Id. at 530. Plaintiffs also alleged that CPSC and its members conspired with the Chicago
Stadium Corporation and the Wirtzes to withhold a lease of Chicago Stadium from IBI, in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and also constituting an attempt to monopolize, monopolization,
and a conspiracy to monopolize in violation of section 2. Id. Fishman and the IBI also claimed that
CPSC and its defendant-members and the Chicago Stadium Corporation and the Wirtzes had conspired with the NBA and certain NBA members, to preclude IBI from purchasing the Bulls by staging a group boycott in violation of sections 1 and 2. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the District Court's ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on this charge, finding that "[s]ince only
one competitor could win NBA approval, it was not in itself anticompetitive for CPSC to suggest to
the NBA that it should be the lucky one." Id. at 544.
96 Fishman, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378 (N.D. Ill. 1981) at 74,789-90.
97 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 525.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 532. The district court found that "[t]he Chicago metropolitan area, like virtually all of
the cities in which the NBA has franchises, cannot as a practical matter support two professional
basketball franchises." Fishman, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378 (N.D. Ill. 1981) at 74,757.
100 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 532. See supra note 25. The defendants argued that substitution of one
competitor for another in the competition for a natural monopoly market does not injure competition and therefore does not violate the antitrust laws. The defendants relied on Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) ("the antitrust laws ... were enacted 'for the protection of competition, not competitors.' ") (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
320 (1962)). The Seventh Circuit noted that Bowl-O-Mat set a requirement that plaintiffs allege an
"antitrust injury" which was "akin to a standing requirement." Since competition for a natural monopoly market is protected by the antitrust laws, any conduct which impaired competition caused
antitrust injury, for which the Sherman Act provided a remedy. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 532-33.
101 Id. at 533. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
102 Id. at 535.
103 Id. The court cited MCI Comm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
104 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 536. The court did note, however, that the Supreme Court in Aspen
Skiing, (see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text) had stated that the effect on consumers is
significant in labeling conduct exclusionary. Id- According to the court in Fishman, a rule which
would make the effect on ultimate consumers the key factor in analyzing conduct by monopolists
would be "capricious, as well as unjust." Id. at 537.
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° finding that in Riegel the competCorporationv. Riegel Textile Corporation,105
itive process was not affected by the defendant's0 6 conduct because the
plaintiff and defendant were not in competition.
With regard to the Wirtzes' and CPSC's refusal to deal with IBI concerning a lease of Chicago Stadium, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Stadium was an essential facility 0 7 and that
the refusal to lease it to IBI without a legitimate business reason was a
violation of section 2.108

IV.

A New Emphasis for Antitrust Law in Some Natural Monopoly
and Essential Facility Cases

A.

The "Chicago School" Commentators' and Aspen Skiing's Apparent
Efficiency Justification Requirement
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Olympia, many courts have focused
on efficiency concerns rather than strictly upon the effect of the conduct
on the plaintiff in evaluating allegedly anticompetitive conduct by lawful
monopolists. 0 9 This shift in emphasis reflects the views of the "Chicago
School" commentators, 10 notably Judge Richard Posner, "I author of
the Olympia opinion; Judge Frank Easterbrook, 1 12 the dissenter in Fish105 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985). In Riegel, the plaintiff disclosed a manufacturing process for antistatic yarn to the defendant, which then applied for a patent
in its own name, although it had promised to keep the process a secret. The Fishman court, in
referring to Riegel, stated:
We ruled that no antitrust cause of action had been stated because only a competitor had
been injured and "[firom the standpoint of antitrust law, concerned as it is with consumer
welfare, it is a matter of indifference whether Riegel or Brunswick exploits a monopoly of antistatic
yarn."

Fishman, 807 F.2d at 538, (quoting Riegel, 752 F.2d at 267 (emphasis added)). The Fishman court
noted that there would have never been any competition between Riegel and Brunswick, and therefore no competitive process to protect, while in the Fishman case there would have been competition
had the Chicago Stadium Corporation leased the Stadium to IBI. Fishman, 807 F.2d at 538.
106 Id. at 538.
107 Id. at 539-40.
108 Id. at 541. The court found that Arthur Wirtz's offer to lease the Stadium to Chicago Basketball rather than IBI was unreasonable, and "agreeing to deal on unreasonable terms is merely a type
of refusal to deal." Id. Looking at the record, the court found sufficient evidence to support a
finding that the Wirtzes and the Chicago Stadium Corporation had no valid business reason to refuse to deal. Id. The court also affirmed the district court ruling that the Chicago Stadium Corporation and its members had agreed with CPSC and the individual defendants not to lease the Stadium
to IBI, and to only lease it to CPSC, in violation of sections 1 & 2. Id.
109 Olympia, 790 F.2d at 375. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. The Olympia court
cited Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261,
266-67 (7th Cir. 1984) (see supra note 105); and Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,
792 F.2d 210, 227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 880 (1987).
110 Eleanor Fox finds one dominant thread in the Chicago School of Economics. In Consumer
Beware Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1714 (1986), Fox notes that:
The thread must be seen against a background conception of law in general, and of antitrust law in particular: The function of most law is to promote efficiency. To do so, the law
should reprehend only that which is inefficient. In commercial enterprise, an act is inefficient only if it lessens 'economic welfare,' which is the sum of producers' and consumers'
welfare.
Id. at 1714-15.
111 See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).

112

See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1 (1984).
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man; and Judge Robert Bork, whose work was cited by the Supreme
113
Court throughout Aspen Skiing.
1
1
4
Aspen Skiing,
the most recent Supreme Court opinion regarding
lawful conduct for a lawful monopolist, reflects this recent change in emphasis. According to the Court in Aspen Skiing, a valid business reason
which would have justified Ski Co.'s conduct was any reason which was
motivated by efficiency concerns." 15 By repeatedly referring to testimony
regarding consumer dissatisfaction, the Court found that Ski Co. apparently was willing to sacrifice the happiness of its customers in order to
116
achieve a "perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival."'
One commentator has noted that Aspen Skiing "directly links the
standard to be applied to each individual fact situation with the ultimate
objectives of the antitrust laws." 1 7 Should the effect on consumers be
the "linchpin""' in section 2 antitrust cases involving a single firm's refusal to deal? 119 Or should it be that "[a] healthy and unimpaired competitive process is presumed to be in the consumer interest,"' 120 even in
the competition for a natural monopoly market?
B.

The Effect On Consumers Of A Monopolist's Refusal To Deal

If the sole purpose of section 2 is to prevent all conduct which has
the effect of foreclosing competition, then "[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains [competition]. To bind, to
restrain, is of their very essence." 12 1 It is obvious that section 2 does not
prohibit every agreement or course of conduct concerning trade. The
Colgate doctrine' 2 2 is evidence of this. What differentiates a nonmonopolist that refuses to deal with a competitor from a monopolist that refuses to deal is the effect that the monopolist's refusal may have on
consumers.
113 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).
114 See supra notes 56-72 and accompanying text.
115 Aspen Skiing, 105 S. Ct. at 2862.
116 Id.
117 Bouknight, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing - The Conduct Standard Under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 6 ENERGY L.J. 275, 279 (1985). Both Bouknight in the above title and Travers in
Does a Monopolist Have A Duty To Deal With Its Rivals? Some Thoughts On The Aspen Skiing Case, 57 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 727 (1986) agree that the standard will be difficult for the courts to apply in practice.
Bouknight, supra, at 279; Travers, supra, at 740. ("It is difficult to articulate rules that do not either
condemn efficient behavior or allow inefficient behavior. At the same time, the comparative vagueness of the general standard can create uncertainty about the legal status of certain practices and,
perhaps, deter desirable conduct.").
118 Fishman, 807 F.2d at 564 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
119 If the courts do require that ultimate consumers must be shown to have been injured in order
for a refusal to deal to constitute a violation of section 2,who should bear the burden of proof? The
Court in Aspen Skiing found that the defendant has the burden ofjustifying its conduct by showing
that it had valid business reasons, i.e., an efficiency justification. The Fishman court refused to place
the burden on the plaintiff to show harm to consumers. Fishman reflects the traditional view preferring unimpaired competition, while Aspen Skiing seems to allow some interference with competition,
so long as it is justified by efficiency concerns.
120 Fishman, 807.F.2d at 536.
121 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
122 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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Upon the nonmonopolist firm's refusal to deal, the party seeking
goods or services can still find another firm to supply its input 123 and can
therefore continue to compete in the market for its output. More firms
24
providing a particular product for consumers means lower prices.
Therefore, the refusal to deal in this instance would not injure consumers
because the supplier firm can simply be replaced by another.
Once a firm is turned down by a monopolist, however, its chances of
securing the input it needs are limited. If it cannot find a source for the
goods or services it needs, the relevant market loses a competitor that it
otherwise could have supported, 2 5 a competitor that would supply desired output.' 26 Fewer competitors means higher prices for consumers. 127 Hence, the foreclosure of competition would have an adverse
effect on consumers.
If, however, the monopolist refuses to deal with a firm that is in competition for a natural monopoly market, or in competition for an essential
facility, that refusal to deal would not result in the elimination of a competitor which the market could otherwise support. 2 8 Only one firm sur123 Since the nonmonopolist which refuses to deal does not have monopoly power in the relevant
market, there must exist other firms which supply the necessary input, and perhaps even a lawful
monopolist.
124 Eleanor Fox notes that:
[t]endencies toward optimal output in a market will, however, improve the position of consumers as buyers of the targeted product, because more units of that product will be available. In addition, the greater output will have a distributive effect, because all units
generally will be available at a lower price.
Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1160 (1981). Efficiency is not solely concerned with lower prices to consumers, but rather an efficiency loss is "the
loss associated with substituting an alternative good for the monopolized good." Id. at 1161, quoting Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEo. L.J. 1075 at 1084 (1980).
Therefore, the resulting higher monopoly prices to consumers force them to look to other substitute
goods that cost society more resources to make. Fox, supra, at 1161.
The lower price to consumers only results, of course, if the relevant market is not a natural
monopoly market, i.e., if it can support more than one firm. If the relevant market is a natural
monopoly market, only one firm can ultimately exist in the market, and foreclosure of competition
will not affect consumers because a monopoly will result either way. In fact, "[i]f such a market
[natural monopoly] contains more than one firm . . . production will continue to consume more
resources than necessary." Posner, supra note 23, at 548.
125 This is assuming that the relevant market is not a natural monopoly, i.e., it can support more
than one firm.
126 Posner in the Olympia opinion noted that "[t]he main economic objection to a monopoly is
that the monopolist restricts output compared to what it would be under competition." Olympia, 797
F.2d at 378.
127 See supra note 124.
128 Judge Easterbrook in his Fishman dissent distinguished five essential facility cases from Fishman, finding that none of the five involved a natural monopoly at each level, as Fishman did:
These cases, like the other essential facility of "bottleneck boycott" cases, share the feature
that the bottleneck was used to suppress horizontal competition that might be of benefit to
consumers-competition that could survive if all firms had access to the essential facility.
...In our case, however, neither the stadium business nor the pro basketball business in
Chicago would be competitive but for the denial of access to the stadium.
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 571 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Cases discussed by Judge Easterbrook included Otter Tail (see supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text) ("Otter Tail used its bottleneck to
prevent Elbow Lake from receiving the benefit of ongoing competition at the generating level."
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 571 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)); City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power
Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981) ("[T]he stratagem was designed
to deprive the consumers of Mishawaka of the benefit of competition in a market (generation) that
was not monopolized ......
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 472 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)); and Hecht (see
supra note 36 and accompanying text) ("[A] city that had an opportunity to have two teams ended up
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vives the competition for a natural monopoly market, and either way the
winner will be a monopolist. 129 In such a case, the consumers are not
prevented from receiving the benefits of competition, i.e., lower prices at
any level of the market. If antitrust law requires the monopolist in this
case to give a valid business reason based on efficiency concerns, and
there is no detrimental effect on consumers whether the monopolist
deals or not, then plaintiffs should not be able to succeed on a section 2
allegation of monopolization.
The presumption in section 2 antitrust law is that monopolies can
often result in higher prices for consumers and an inefficient allocation
of resources.1 3 0 It is for that very reason that even lawful monopolies are
suspect. Monopoly power which was once the result of superior skill or
luck may become the result of predatory, anticompetitive conduct that is
harmful to consumers. 3 1 In a competition for a natural monopoly market, however, the consumer will face the "evil" monopolist regardless of
the outcome. The antitrust laws, therefore, should be concerned with
preventing the formation and continuation of illegal monopolies which
will injure consumers but should not be concerned with determining
which prospective natural monopolist would be the best from the consumers' perspective.13 2 Tort law should govern "anticompetitive" conduct in such a situation.
with one. This is a suppression of horizofital competition." Fishman, 807 F.2d at 572 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting)).
The majority in Fishman recognized that the essential facility cases cited by Judge Easterbrook
differed from the Fishman case in "some economic respects." However, the majority stated that the
dissent was "engaging in post hoc analysis. There is nothing in any of these opinions to suggest that
the economic phenomena identified by the dissent were important considerations to the courts
which found antitrust violations in these cases." Fishman, 807 F.2d at 535. Judge Easterbrook responded that the "holdings of decisions are more important than their language," and that the majority in Otter Tail did not even reveal their reason for holding'as they did. Id. at 573-74. Since
"[o]pinion about the offense of monopolization has undergone an evolution," it is reasonable to
impute a rationale to the Otter Tail majority which would reflect such an evolution. Id. at 574, quoting Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d at 375. See supra notes 78-89
and accompanying text.
129 Judge Easterbrook in his Fishman dissent noted that unlike the Hecht case (see supra note 36
and accompanying text), the plaintiffs in Fishman did not want to break up a monopoly, rather "they
wanted to be a monopoly." Fishman, 807 F.2d at 572 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
130 See supra note 124.
131 See the discussion of natural monopolies, supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text, and the
essential facility doctrine, supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
132 The Fishman court rejected this very contention. In Fishman, the defendants argued that only
conduct which ultimately injures consumers is violative of the antitrust laws. The Seventh Circuit
responded that:
[a] rule that made the legality of arguably predatory conduct at ihe level of entry into the
consumer market depend on whetherpost hoc analysis could clearly identify adverse impacts
on ultimate consumers would be capricious, as well as unjust. Following this approach
would mean that if two teams were presumed to' survive, see Hecht, 570 F.2d 982, the Sherman Act had been violated. But if only one could be practically supported, very similar
business conduct would be unexceptionable ....Here, there seems to be no way of telling
whether IBI or CPSC would be a "better" owner from the, perspective of basketball fans.
•I
Fishman, 807 F.2d at 537.
The Fishman court apparently was not willing to recognize the evolution of the law of monopoly,
especially the law involving legal conduct for lawful monopolists (see supra note 85) of which the
Olympia court was so willing to take note. Olympia, 797 F.2d at 375. The Olympia' court cited Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone
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Of course, there have been and will be cases involving competition
for a natural monopoly market in which efficiency concerns will require
that the competition be protected by the antitrust laws. Otter Tail and
Terminal Railroad are two examples.13 3 In both cases, the natural monopoly market was related to a market at another level which was not a natural monopoly market and could therefore support more than one firm.
By allowing the controller of an essential facility or any other monopolist
to refuse to deal in this situation would in fact foreclose competition and
would deprive the consumers of the benefits of competition at the non34
natural monopoly market level.'
V. Conclusion
A single-firm lawful monopolist controlling an essential facility or a
natural monopoly market which refuses to deal with a firm in competiton
for a natural monopoly or an essential facility brings into play the tension
in antitrust law between the Colgate doctrine, which allows single firms to
refuse to deal, and a basic tenet of antitrust law which condemns the
withholding of facilities or goods essential to market access from competitors. A lawful monopolist's refusal to deal with a firm that is competing
for a natural monopoly market or an essential facility does not have the
same effect as a lawful monopolist's refusal to deal with a competitor for
a non-natural monopoly market. The former's refusal does not eliminate
a competitor which the market could otherwise support, while the latter's
refusal does.
Leaving aside the proposition that efficiency is or should be the goal
of all laws, or even the "linchpin" of antitrust law, it seems that in certain
limited situations the effect which a firm's refusal to deal has on consumers should be an important consideration. Protecting and encouraging
competition is fine, but assessing treble damages against a defendant
who chooses to deal with one firm over another when only one of the
firms would have successfully entered the market anyway may be carrying
the protection of competition too far to the point of protecting individual
competitors. The protection of individual competitors should be the
goal of tort law, not antitrust law.
Mary Ellen Schill
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266-67 (7th
Cir. 1984) (see supra note 105); and Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d
210, 227-29 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
133 See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (Otter Tail); see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (Terminal Railroad).
134 [C]ompetition is valued for many reasons, only one of which is that it yields a competitive
price and the related resource allocation. Encouraging competition at one vertical level
even though another is monopolized yields all of the benefits of competition which are not
associated with resource allocation and may eventually even yield some or all of those. Additional firms at the non-monopoly level means not only price competition at that level but
also competition in innovation. It also increases the number of firms involved and interested in the technology and may provide a base for entry at the blockaded level as firms at
the competitive level grow weary of paying monopoly prices and decide to integrate back to
the monopoly level.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 5, § 48, at 129.

